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questions about human life which separated them from other classes, from theologians, from 
artists, from writers" (p. 154). While, as already stated, many of us in the Third World would 
tend to think similarly, Buck states that he does not "think about science inthose terms" (p. 155). 
Coming back to the first essay, Elkana agrees in it - in passing - that "science is the most 
important dimension of Western culture" (p. 8); that, for example "viewing the common-sense 
explanation as a special case of the theoretical, is more typical of Western science than of 
traditional thought" (p. 30); that "the most typical feature of Western thought is that, at least 
since the seventeenth century, the theoretical entities have been segregated into two classes which 
are respectively employed in theology and by science" (p. 30); and, finally, that "'Western 
science is distinctive.., in creating deliberately new experiences by inventing theoretical entities 
in advance of common-sense observations". (p. 30) - all of which is a round about and rather 
grudging way of singling out Science as being unique and of  speaking of a hypotheticodeductive 
method. 
The book is tightly written and well edited but its authors belong exclusively to developed 
nations and, from an underdeveloped perspective, which is mine, its vantage point seems blasd and, 
to some extent, decadent. It is part of the present anti-science movement, in its most refined and 
subtle guise. Its chief objective, however, which is "'to be suggestive, to stimulate further research 
and investigation" (Mendelsohn's introduction p. XI) has been achieved and the suggestion that 
science be located "in cultural space" and the actors, their actions, and their knowledge be 
understood "within the broader contexts of cultural explanation and anthropological study" 
(Preface p. VIII) is certainly acceptable and timely. 
I know, however, that it is no longer fashionable to speak of the bounties of  science and to be 
"celebratory of the sciences and scientists" (Preface p. VII), after Hiroshima, the population 
explosion and pollution. But here in theThird World we are pining for the results of an efficacious 
Western Science, since we are only too well aware of the alternative to it: poverty and dependence. 
Either we adopt Science, at the same time trying to avoid its "'perverse effects" as the French 
Sociologist Raymond Boudon terms them, or we remain subject to Western scientific and techno- 
logical imperialism as subject people. 
All the same, Sciences and Cultures will have the healthy effect of combating the arrogance of 
most practicing scientists, in all Worlds, who, however, are not likely to read the book, destined to 
a relatively small elite of social and anthropological scholars who are interested in the scientific 
phenomenon as an object of study. 
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Scientific thinking has been a subject of inquiry since at least 1830 with the work of A. Comte. 
An explanation of scientific thinking that is comparable to Darwin's explanation of the origin of 
species, for example, does not yet exist. This book indicates the great variety of  approaches 
toward an explanation of scientific activity and critically evaluates them. It concludes with the 
assertion that the time has come for "'new alliances between the various disciplines that study 
scientific knowledge, new alliances between the natural and the social sciences which will reveal 
the intricate complementarity between knowledge of external worlds and models of ourselves." 
Whether such alliances will lead to a satisfying explanation and whether the cognitive approach 
to these alliances will bear fruit is left open. 
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De Mey does lead the reader masterfully through the various disciplines that study scientific 
knowledge. He reveals even to those familiar with that literature new patterns of looking at how 
they interrelate. He does this by weaving together examples from artificial intelligence, cognitive 
science, genetic epistemology, philosophy, and other traditional and modern areas of scholarship. 
The book is organized around what D. Michie had regarded to be four stages in the development 
of artificial intelligence since 1950. These four stages are held to have parallels in the studies of 
science. The stages are labeled as: 
(1) a monadic stage, in which a pattern is recognized by means of template-matching. This 
corresponds to positivism; 
(2) a structural stage, in which a pattern is recognized by virtue of its being constructed from 
more elementary features according to rules of formation, production and transformation. This 
corresponds to logical positivism, 
(3) a contextual stage, in which a pattern such as/A is disambiguated depending on whether 
it is in the context of THE or C~T. This corresponds to the sciences of science; and 
(4) the present, cognitive stage, in which a pattern can be recognized and disambiguated only 
by bringing world and/or specialized knowledge to bear upon the task. This corresponds to to 
paradigm theory. 
Having introduced this structure in Chapters 1 and 2, the author presents in Chapter 3 the 
germinal ideas of positivism as a monadic view. He does this in a way that recaptures some of the 
enthusiasm that must have accompanied the insights at the time they were originated. With the 
simple idea that information is data that fills in forms, De Mey identifies Kant's reason with form 
and experience with the data that is filled in. The cognitive view is already noticed in British 
empiricism: object perception is not  solely seeing the object; it involves seeing what one knows 
as well. The attempt to integrate and unify the rapidly expanding scientific specialties led to 
critical positivism. This, as articulated by Mach in 1886, held that "the world consists only of our 
sensations." Mach meant that for a human observer, sensations were primary - his experiments 
on how moving black and white pictures can give rise to the experience of color typified his 
position. The function of science, according to Mach and Pearson, is not to explain, but to group 
or classify or associate sense-impressions into appropriate clusters of monads. Some of the most 
ambitious contemporary models of the "'mindful brain" (Edelman, 1978) appear to subscribe to 
this monadic view in their stress on natural (Darwinian) selection of neuronal groups as recognizers 
of external signals from a pre-existing diversity of such groups that suffices to recognize all 
laossible signals of value, even with enough redundancy to accommodate imprecision. 
The concern with language marks the transition from positivism to logical positivism. Language 
is not merely the result of associated sense data, but, rather, a source of the forms for collecting 
and processing data. Science is thus a well-structured system of sentences linked to facts. Syntactic 
considerations predominate over semantic ones. But their application to empirical sciences has 
resulted in confusion, notably one between principles of logical reconstruction and rules for 
production of science. De Mey's assertion that philosophy of science is preeminently logical 
positivism and shows a preference for debate over understanding would not be generally accepted 
by contemporary philosophers of science. The current movement is historical realism, with stress 
on case histories by scholars such as Shapere and Holton. 
The search for contexts of science led to concern with the history, sociology, psychology, 
economics and many other sciences of science alongside the philosophy of science. B. Hessen's 
seminal 1932 paper that gave rise to externalism - a reference that was omitted in DeMey's 
otherwise very scholarly treatment - analyzed the social and economic conditions that  contributed 
to Newtonian science and stimulated the work of Merton and, subsequently, separate disciplinary 
studies of science. 
The cognitive view of science integrated all these specialized approaches. Like the Copernican 
revolution, Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions has as its first stage "'the combination of 
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various cultural influences into a well-defined technical problem. Far-reaching implications for 
society become manifest only after the technical problem and its solution have been accepted, 
first by the community of specialists directly concerned and secondly by the specialist communities 
of other affected disciplines." (p. 83) Kuhn postulates an alteration between normal science, 
characterized by rigid tradition, and revolutionary science. Because a paradigm does not evolve but 
is replaced, cumulative growth occurs 0nly with respect to a given paradigm. A paradigm is a 
model, a cognitive structure, that shapes expectations of "normal" scientists. 
"Despite the diffuse nature and the many deficiencies of the concept of paradigm, some groups 
of researchers have been willing to accept it as a challenge to their ingenuity and see it as their 
task to make it sharper and more substantial." (p. 107) De Mey calls these researchers paradigm 
detectors and paradigm dissectors. He devotes the three chapters of Part II to the former and three 
to the latter in Part III. 
Part II, entitled "The Social Structure of Science," begins with a chapter on bibliometries 
and the structure of  science. To many specialists in this area, this will be a fresh and well-structured 
approach to their field. It is reasonably up-to-date and critical, bringing together in a coherent 
way many well-known methods and results about the growth of science, citation networks and 
various kinds of bibliographic links. In Chapter 8, de Mey offers a lucid exposition of the Ben- 
David-Collins account of the origin of specialities, using the example of Wundt's migration from 
physiology to found psychology. In Chapter 9, he demonstrates his ability to synthesize by 
combining features from models for the life cycle of specialties due to Goffman, Crane, Mulkay, 
Mullins, Radnitzky into four stages: the pioneering stage, characterized by a philosophic attitude, 
creativity, originality, richness of ideas and limited sloppiness; the building stage, one of normal 
science, solid knowledge, exponential growth in formal publications; internal criticism, with 
rigorous, precise, transparent standard texts but also with first signs of disintegration; external 
c~iticism, in which the specialty becomes defensive by dogmatization, immunization and trivial- 
ization. 
The three chapters of Part III, "Cognitive Structure and Dynamics of Science," are: Paradigms 
in the Psychology of Attention and Perception"; "Puzzle-Solving and Reorganization of World 
Views"; "Conservation and the Dynamics of Conceptual Systems." Analogies between the rabbit/ 
duck, wife/mother-in-law, rat/man, pelican/antelope figures on the one hand and the Galen/Harvey 
view of blood circulation are artfully exhibited. Drawing of parallels, such as between Piaget's 
schemes and Minsky's frames, abound throughout the book and come to a climax in the last 
chapter. De Mey's grasp of the literature that he brings together, organizes and synthesizes is 
truly comprehensive. Yet there are significant omissions, for example: the works of Lotka, 
Nalimov, D. MacKay, S. Amarel, M. Moravcsik and this reviewer. But the book is a valuable 
contribution to the literatures of  cognitive science, computer science, information science, 
sciences of science, philosophy and the social sciences generally. 
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